On the evening of 6 September, the Defence Ministry, finally managed to issue a tediously long and fatiguingly  laboured statement on General Sundarji's interview of 1 September to India Today. If there be an appropriate description of this effort, it is in the ministry's text itself:  The  statement  is  "misleading";  also,  that  "the  assumptions"  on  which  it  is  based reveal  an  alarming  lack  of  elementary  "understanding"  of  the;  responsibilities  that  the ministry of defence has. In fact, it is this disturbing incapacity demonstrated yet again, in writing, by this statement, that compels me to take up issues with the ministry of defence. Before  dealing  with  those  worrisome  aspects,  there  is  need,  however,  to  immediately dispose off this question about the Official Secrets Act. Indeed, the ministry of defence, while  expressing  its  concern  on  the  subject  has  chosen  to  refer  to  my  article  of  5 September.  It  has  been  suggested  that  that  constituted  "an  impropriety"  on  General Sundarji's  part.  All  the  more  reason,,  therefore,  why  it  is  my  continuing  responsibility  to question this government on its assumptions.

I  am,  frankly,  astounded  at  the  suggestion  implicit  in  the  defence  ministry's statement. It has forgotten too easily, and that ought to be a matter of deep reflection by all of  us,  that  the  security  of  the  nation  is  a  national  concern;  not a sole  proprietary  right. Indeed, in most parliamentary democracies, threat assessments are routinely shared with the opposition. We forget, too, that in principle, the entire parliament is not only bound on oath  with  that  responsibility,  indeed  in  a  sense,  the  entire  parliament  is  also  part  of  the governance  of  the  country.  What  the  former  COAS did  in  sharing  his  concerns  with  a Member  of  our  Parliament,  about  the  morale  of  the  armed  forces,  about equipment induction into the army, and about the manner in which the government of the day was handling the attendant controversy, was not any violation of the Official Secrets Act. It was also,  most  definitely,  not  violative  of  any  other high  responsibility  that  the  COAS  then carried. Indeed, he was actuated only by his over-riding concern of 'national honour1, and very much that of national security. In passing, it has to be briefly mentioned that, in any case,  the  entire briefing  of  the  Consultative  Committee,  of  27  and  28  September  1987, dealt  with  a  great  deal  of  classified information,  all  of  which  was  being  shared  with members of Parliament.

The   most   disturbing   aspect   of  this statement   is what   it reveals about   the management of our national security apparatus. Who is managing it? How are decisions being taken? Which is the deliberative body that is analysing situations and then proposing alternative courses of action? The defence ministry has gone to great lengths to explain why the former COAS's note suggesting cancellation of the contract with Bofors was found as not acceptable. The COAS had, after consultation, reflection and analysis expressed an opinion  that  the  country  could well  take  this  "acceptable  risk". The  ministry  now  says: "There was, therefore, in the then prevailing security environment, a definite risk attendant upon  delaying  the  induction  of  such  a  weapon".  Here,  I  am  not  going  into the  patent hollowness  of  this  assertion,  of  a  decade  long  absence  of  such  a  weapon,  of  the  still insufficient supply of it; ''not even one regiment worth" - CAG, March 1989. My concern is more fundamental. It is about this yawning disparity, these irreconcilable assessments of threats facing the country, between the COAS and the government of the day.