In 1964, with its nuclear tests at Lopnor, China announced its arrival in the nuclear world. For us in India, this news, though expected, had followed our traumatic military reverses of 1962. Since then, for almost two decades now, we have continued to live with the reality - of a nuclear China. Recent missile tests by that country have also established its intercontinental launch abilities, a significant advance in the field. Yet, when the debate in India on our nuclear options hots up, it does not talk of China. Very largely, it confines itself to a deep concern about Pakistan's nuclear programmes.

Diverse views are held, antipodal in their extremes. Positions oscillate between India going nuclear being "immoral", and India not choosing to exercise this option also being "immoral". In this articulation of our concerns, we continue to discount the reality of a nuclear China. The nuclear might of neighbouring Soviet Union does not worry us and, despite the experience of the bewildering forays of US. Enterprise into the Bay of Bengal in the 70's, the nuclear arsenal of the USA does not cause us any concern either.

APPREHENSION

As in other matters, our worries seem to be centered on Pakistan. Ever since the late Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto spoke rhetorically of "eating grass" but ''going nuclear", we have lived with that apprehension. Unattributable reports, most of them emanating from the West (this raises the very interesting question, what is India's own intel-ligence on the subject?), point towards the imminence of such a misadventure by our neighbour.

'Two things need to be said here. One is a reality, however hard and unacceptable. Should Pakistan ever go nuclear, then there is no political leader (and 1 can conceive of no government in India) who would be able to restrain the groundswell of public opinion from launching the nation on this perilous, tin-chartered path. That is precisely why it is necessary to articulate this concern and to debate the issue. Secondly, we ought to accept that we just do not know enough about the subject. Most of our information is second-hand. Our reactions are not conclusions arrived at after a distilled analysis of the options available or the consequences of adopting one or another kind of policy posture. We alternate between grandiose saber-rattling and "ahimsa".

We need to ask ourselves some searching questions. Would we still have nuclear aspirations if it were demonstrably established that there was just no possibility of Pakistan going nuclear? Or are we seeking an independent nuclear status? If so, is it with a view to having a first-strike deterrence capability, or a reactive, residual, assured destructive ability giving us the "security" of deterrence? If the former, do we have the political will for it or are we, in the compelling phrase of McNamara, Bundy.Kennan and Smith, seeking the "acquisition of a weapons system solely for the purpose of preventing its use"?

Even that is subject to serious questioning. Because, of what relevance is the concept of "deterrence"' in our sub continental context? Is it not axiomatic that such a restraint will apply only on the sane, the deterrable? On the other hand, if it is an inde-pendent nuclear capability that we seek, irrespective of what others ('mainly Pakistan) may or may not do, have we sat down to analyse the diplomatic, economic, military and social consequences of it?

We have to begin at the beginning, for it is in that context that the relevance of our 1974 Pokharan blast lies. My view is that the Pokharan effort was an ad hoc, ill thought out, spur of the moment, act which has caused great harm to India and has not contributed a single positive gain to the country. It is my belief that, as a result of that needless explosion, India has lost a great deal. I am unable to comprehend even now as to what if any, scientific advancement was achieved by that blast.

The ad hoc nature of the experiment is evident in our continuing to call it, misleadingly, a "peaceful" nuclear explosion. To be able to carry out the test in the summer of 1974, the decision to go ahead must have been taken in early 1972. That was a period of the culmination of the then Government's internal and external policies. Therefore, other than as an expression of a kind of national power symbol, I fail to find any other explanation for it. To call the test "peaceful", when until today we have not been able effectively to translate or even demonstrate any economic use for it, is to question everyone's intelligence. When the real advancement all over the world is in the field of electronics, it does not cloak our efforts to assert tangentially that Pokharan was an effort to keep up with the technological Joneses.

As for diplomatic gains, if there were any, then they continue to remain pretty effectively disguised. It is open to serious questioning whether that blast helped us militarily or if it contributed in, any manner either to our national security or served our national interests.

That egg, unfortunately, cannot now be unscrambled. So what are the options available to India? A study conducted has revealed that as percentage possibilities, after accounting for all relevant inputs, the chances of India going nuclear are as much as 53%, against 26% for Pakistan. Admittedly, this figure is as good or bad as any. It does, nevertheless, reflect the total capability of these two nations to adopt a nuclear course. Before going any further, let me, very briefly, recount the possible compulsions for India embarking on this course. Such compulsions could cover within their ambit concepts like deterrence, the use of a nuclear weapon as part of the total defence arsenal, as an expression of India's "power" to influence and emphasize our regional, sub-continental real-politik or even (though somewhat unconvincingly) our international status. And, finally, it could even serve as a reason from the purely internal national will or morale aspect. As an exercise towards the strengthening and advancement of a scientific, technological and military momentum, the compulsions would be very difficult to bring under sharp focus.

What are some of the other question marks? These have now to be voiced, largely in order to create a concern as also to activate a debate. If ever we are called upon to decide, as a nation, we must know what we are doing. The very first query is whether our attempts at a nuclear cure are not worse than the ailment itself. Let me elaborate on this. We have blindly adopted the esoteric, nuclear mumbo-jumbo of the West, without pausing to relate it to the functional reality of this subcontinent. A colleague, in a highly perceptive remark, once observed: "Like China, India does not belong to the Third or any other world. It is a world of its own". Now, this is in fact not a boast. It is merely the recognition of a reality.

Of course, simultaneously, one has to concede that this whole convoluted nuclear question is an indication of the increasing complexity of conflicts between nation States as also of international relations. But for us the central question is largely derivative. Given a situation of economic (IMF, etc.) and armaments (Soviet arms, French aircraft, German subs, etc.) dependence, is an independent nuclear aspiration by India at all feasible? In an attempt to answer this as illustrative of what can be done, quite often China's case (as indeed that of France) is pointed out. Are these examples relevant? In finding an answer, the aspects of costs and technology acquire primacy. We have already accepted that ours is a dependent economy. When talking of nuclear weapons, one is not envisioning merely a Hiroshima-Nagasaki kind of a "crude" effort which could perhaps even be rolled out of the open doorway of a Boeing 737. We are envisaging a nuclear doctrine of "first strikes" and "deterrence''.

India's nuclear capability would then comprise essentially our ability to hit targets of our choice first, or in retaliation. Assuming hypothetically, that we cannot entirely discount China's existing nuclear ability, or Pakistan's aspirations, but are not taking into account the greater reality of nuclear super Powers (both in our ocean peri pheries as also on the Asian landmass), then our effort be-comes an attempt at joining the big league. We are talking in terms of at least an IRBM (Intermediate Range Ballistic Missile) capability. How else would you reach even the peripheries of our possible targets?

So we need a launch and a propulsion ability, command and control expertise, a surveillance system and a far more sophisticated intelligence than what we have now- There would then be the command and control costs. These are at the same time the most difficult and the most costly. The aspect of reentry, even with Western tech-nology, is quite often the most difficult aspect. With us the problems in this field appear almost insurmountable. If as a nation we are unable effectively to run our telephone systems, railways, buses or our public sector plants, how will we manage a nuclear arsenal?

This is not merely a facetiously expressed managerial concern. It translates itself into the totality of our cost concerns because of our proven inability to aggregate all the required environmental technology into the needed effort. From the Pokharan blast to the SLV-3, it has taken us more than seven years. That does not belittle the achievement of the space launch itself, significant as it continues to be. It is merely to point out the reality of the situation as it exists.

On the other hand, even if our aspirations are for the "crudest" of nuclear bombs, we would still need to deliver them in an effective kind of an aircraft which has speed, range, load capability, along with the ability to evade enemy interception. What do we have in that range and on whom are we dependent for it? Should, how-ever, our efforts be in the field of rockets as delivery systems, then we would have to find answers to the problem of sitting. If we site them on land, then we are faced with the possibility of their destruction by an enemy first strike even before we have got them off the ground. We really cannot consider the option of mounting them on our railway wagons and keep shunting them in the care of Indian Railways. The USA thought of this option until a was quipped, "What if the wagons get lost?" So one has to start thinking in terms of an SLBM or a Submarine Launched Ballistic Missile. Here we are faced with the reality of only just having to think in terms of manufacturing our own submarines and that, too, with German assistance. This, very basically put across, is what is often referred to as one aspect of the "escalatory effect" of nuclear aspiration.

Let us then take straight costs. .Needing more money to spend on our nuclear effort, assume, for arguments sake, that we increase our defence spending from the present level of 4% of our GNP to 6%. That would perhaps enable us to have roughly double the present de-fence budget. Even that would hardly suffice. A study, recently made by the Centre for Policy Research, points out that between 1955 and 1980. France spent approximately $20 billion to achieve an independent but limited nuclear capability. During its current modernization programme, it will now be spending another $60 billion to achieve a capability of around 200 strategic launchers by about 1995. After discounting lower labour costs but taking into consideration the factor of a relatively weak industrial and technical infrastructure, the study suggests that it would cost us around $75 billion over a period of 15 years.

OPTION

We all know that exercising a nuclear option does not obviate the continued necessity for conventional weapons. If one were to add, to our assumed nuclear costs, the continuing, routine conventional weapons programmes during the next 15 years, we may require of our people to spend a sum of around $150 billion. Please note that one is not taking into consideration the further "escalatory'' effect of ''parity" attempt-ing to move to "dominance" so that the "window of vulnerability" is closed. Even if the figures are open to serious questioning, the fact remains-as tellingly pointed out in the study—that with that sort of money, "at present levels and at a very rough estimate, we could acquire 750 very high performance fighter aircraft. almost 100 naval warships and possibly, around 20.000 AFV's and 4,000 helicopters".

Despite all this, you could well argue that a great nation like ours could certainly put up with such costs. I am tempted to remark that, if we do decide that these costs are to be borne budgetarily, then without doubt the price shall have to be paid socially by us.